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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LY~K '''· )!.A.RTIN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 7731

PAl1 L H. STEVENS,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of s.eptember 25, 1950, at about 7 :00
A.M. plaintiff was driving south on 18th East in his automobile. It was a clear morning; the streets were dry.
As he travelled south on 18th East he approached the
intersection of 18th East and Stratford Avenue. Upon
approaching this intersection he slowed down. Looking
to the east is a "blind intersection;" to the west it is
open. Plaintiff looked to the west first; as he got closer
to the corner he looked to the east and saw that it was
clear and then proceeded into the intersection. As he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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proceeded into the intersection, he turned his head back
to the right to check again. At that time he heard the
brakes or the tires. squealing on the defendant's automobile. Plaintiff looked back to the left and saw that defendant's car was setting up a skid that was carrying
defendant's car right into the side of plaintiff's car.
Plaintiff jammed on his brakes and stopped, hoping defendant would not hit him squarely in the door by which
he was sitting. R. 19, 20, 34, 38.
Plaintiff's automobile came to a stop a little beyond
the center of the intersection, i.e., to the south. The left
front fender and wheel of defendant's automobile struck
plaintiff's car at the front post of the left front door. R.

21.
The impact of defendant's automobile colliding
against plaintiff's rendered plaintiff unconscious. Plaintiff's automobile, by reason of the impact, was knocked
west on Stratford Avenue up over two front yards and
a hedge. Plaintiff's automobile came to rest on the parking a distance of 156 feet from the point of impact. R.
21, 83. Defendant's automobile came to a rest at a point
about 18 feet in a southerly direction from the point of
impact.
Plaintiff first observed defendant's automobile when
it was about 60 feet up the street. R. 22. There were no
traffic signs or controls at the intersection.
The northeast corner of 18th East and Stratford
Avenue is built up quite a bit higher than the road.
There is a fence with vines growing over it extending
from the house almost to the sidewalk on Stratford Ave2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nue. The fence then runs east son1e 42 feet, then north
encompassing the lot.
There are trees gro,ving along the east parking of
18th East as you approach the intersection. The north
parking of Stratford Avenue is also planted with trees.
Between the fence and sidewalk shrubs were growing.
There is a large "\veeping "\villow tree which covers most
of the west lawn. The trees which are growing in the
parking areas haYe branches close to the grounds and
were thick with foliage. The trunks of these trees were
about six inches in diameter. R. 23, 41, 44.
Plaintiff testified that as he approached the intersection he knew it was blind to the east. He looked first
to the west and than as he got fairly close to the intersection, he looked to the east. At that time he could see
approximately 150 to 200 feet eastward up Stratford
Avenue. There were no cars visible at that time.
There were four solid lines of skid marks made by
the tires of defendant's automobile extending east from
the point of impact a distance of 57 to 65 feet. R. 34, 83.
Plaintiff, in stopping his automobile, left skid marks
of approximately two feet in length. R. 34. 18th East
Street and Stratford Avenue are. asphalt covered streets.
R. 46. There is a survey monument located in the center
of the intersection. From this monument to the northernmost tire mark of defendant's automobile it was a
distance of 22 inches. R. 36.
As one app-roaches Stratford Avenue when driving
south on 18th East, the view to the east on Stratford

3
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Avenue is obstructed by a high fence, vines, bushes, trees,
etc., so that the. front portion of the automobile would be
halfway through the intersection before a clear view
of Stratford Avenue could be gained. R. 44, 45.
It was stipulated that the asphalt surface of 18th
East Street was 25.75 feet wide; that the asphalt surface of Stratford Avenue was 28 feet wide. See Exhibit
C., R. 46.
Plaintiff's car, after the collision, had a salvage
value of $155.55. R. 53.
Stratford Avenue, running east from the intersection, rises in an average grade of 3~%. R. 71. The top
of the fence running around the corner lot is about 7
feet above the asphalt surface of 18th East Street. The
eye level on the average automobile is about 5¥2 feet, so
that it is not possible to see over the fence while driving
along in an automobile. R. 72.
Exhibit D, which was admitted in evidence, shows
the various distances of visibility eastward up Stratford
Avenue as a motorist approaches Stratford Avenue
travelling south on 18th East Street. F·or example, when
30 feet from the corner, there is a possibility of seeing
some 105 feet east; 20 feet from the corner 205 feet;
15 feet from the corner 465 feet. However, as was testified to by Witness Rogers, there is quite a bit of shrubbery and trees that temporarily block out the line of
vision or obstruct it entirely and a good field of vision
is not available. R. 73. These distances would also vary
depending on whether the car coming down Stratford
4
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Avenue "'"as nearer the nortl1 side of the road or the
south side. R. 76. Conversely, a motorist driving west
on Stratford ..A.venue 'vould have the same difficulties
in ascertaining the traffic coming into the intersection
from the north.
Officer Peterson testified that defendant stated that
he was going west on St!atford Avenue, saw plaintiff's
car approaching the intersection, put on his brakes, but
was unable to stop prior to hitting plaintiff. R. 84.
Officer Farnsworth testified that if defendant's
automobile had come to a complete stop·, leaving 57 feet
of brake marks on the dry asphalt surface, defendant
would have been travelling 32 miles per hour or more.
This is assuming that the brakes of defendant's car were
in good condition. R. 88. Officer Farnsworth also testified that if defendant's automobile did not come to a complete stop within that 57 feet, which it obviously did not,
the speed of defendant's automobile would naturally be
higher. R. 89.
According to Salt Lake City Ordinance number 6138,
the maximum speed limit on Stratford Avenue is 25 miles
per hour.
At the close of plaintiff's case, a discussion concerning a question of law was had in the judge's chambers
and upon returning to the courtroom, the defendant
made the following motion. (R. 90, 91):
"Comes now the defendant and moves that the jury
be directed to return a verdict in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff on the plaintiff's complaint,

5
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no cause of action, for the following grounds and reasons:
"1. There is no evidence in the record of any negligence upon the part of the defendant.
"2. There is no evidence that any negligence on
the part of the defendant was the cause of the accident
and the injuries, if any, sustained by the plaintiff.
"3. The plaintiff's own testimony and the testimony
of the other witnesses offered by the plaintiff shows conclusively that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence which was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
"4. The plaintiff's testimony and the other evidence
adduced on behalf of the plaintiff show the plaintiff to
have been guilty of contributory negligence which was
a substantial proximate cause of the accident."
Defendant's motion was granted by the court. R. 91.
S.TATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION THAT THE JURY BE DIRECTED TO RETURN A
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND AGAINST
PLAINTIFF OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR
THE JURY TO DECIDE AND CANNOT BE DECIDED BY
THE COURT AS A MATTER. OF LAW.
(a)

(b) ASSUMING PLAINTIFF WAS IN SOME MANNER
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

Defendant's motion, which was granted by the

court~

6
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sets forth four grounds. Ho\veYer, it is obvious that the
fourth ground \vas the one upon ,,·hich the court based its
decision in this n1a tter, thn t is, vvhether plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and
\Yhich negligence was a substantial legal cause of the
accident. There can be no question but that defendant
himself was guilty of negligence which was the substantial legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
ARGUMENT
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR
THE JURY TO DECIDE AND CANNOT BE DECIDED BY
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
(a)

Even though this case was not tried in the District
Court by the present attorneys on appeal, it is apparent
that the trial judge in ruling upon the defendant's motion
was persuaded that the doctrine in the cases of Hickok
v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514, March 5, 1948,
and c·onklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437, May
11, 1948, should be applied to this case. It is the write-r's
contention that the facts of this case do not come within
the doctrine as expressed in these cases and that under ·
no circumstances should that doctrine be extended to include a case of this type. Plaintiff's argument is, that
whether he was guilty of contributory negligence, which
was a substantial and legal cause of the collision in question, should have been submitted to the jury for their
sole determination.

7
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Plaintiff, upon approaching Stratford Avenue on the
morning of the collision, looked first to the right and
then, as he drew closer to the intersection, looked to
the left and could see approximately 150 to 200 feet east
up Stratford Avenue. Seeing that no cars were in view,
plaintiff then proceeded into the intersection, at the same
time turning his head back to the right to ascertain if
any cars were coming from that direction. At this point,
plaintiff heard the screeching of brakes and looking back
to the left, he saw defendant's automobile setting up a
skid some 60 feet to the east. Plaintiff jammed on his
brakes and stopped. Defendant, unable to stop his automobile, skidded for some sixty feet into the side of plaintiff's automobile. The exact point of the collision was a
little beyond the center of the intersection. From the
survey monument located in the center of the intersection to the northernmost tire mark of defendant's ·
auto, was a distance of 2·2 inches, which would place defendant's automobile substantially over the center line
of Stratford Avenue. On the basis of these facts, it is
impossible to understand how the trial court could hold
as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and that such negligence was a substantial legal cause of the accident.
Generally sp·eaking, a motorist proceeding to a point
near an intersection from which he can see a sufficient
distance to ascertain that anyone coming from beyond,
at any lawful speed, will not interfere with his safe
crossing, may rightfully proceed. There cannot be thrust
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upon the plaintiff the duty to foresee and avoid the negligence of the defendant, "'"ho obviously proceeded down
Stratford _.A. venue at an tmla.,Yful rate of speed, oblivious
to the fact that he could not see cars approaching from
the north into the intersection of 18th East and Stratford
Avenue, and unlawfully demanding that automobiles approaching from his right yield the right of way to him
regardless of their position in the intersection. Having
once made a reasonable observation as to the traffic on
Stratford Avenue, plaintiff is not negligent because he
does not again look for approaching vehicles before making the crossing.
Plaintiff testified that when he looked to the· east
he could see approximately 150 to 200 feet up Stratford
Avenue. For example, according to Exhibits c. and D,
if plaintiff were 20 feet back from the corner he could
see approximately 205 feet eastward up Stratford Avenue. Accordingly, plaintiff would then he some 46 feet
from the exact center of the intersection. Plaintiff testified that he was traveling 10 or 15 miles per hour as he
approached the intersection. At this speed plaintiff would
traverse that distance in some 2 or 3 seconds. Assuming
defendant were just beyond the 205 ft mark on Stratford
Avenue, defendant would then be about 214 feet from the
exact center of the intersection. Accordingly defendant
would be traveling between 45 to 55 miles per hour in
order to meet plaintiff at the exact center of the intersection. Certainly it is not unreasonable to conclude that
defendant was traveling at such a rate of speed and

9
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the jury could find such to be true. Where, under such
a state of facts, can it be said that plaintiff neglected his
duty in any way or failed to act as a reasonably prudent
man would act under similar circumstances~
c·ertainly there cannot be thrust upon plaintiff the
necessity of guarding against the unlawful speed which
defendant must have been travelling down Stratford
Avenue. It should be noted that the officer testified that
from the 57 feet of black skid marks burned into the
asphalt surface, he estimated the defendant would have
been travelling 32 miles an hour, or more, if defendant
had stopped at the end of the 57 feet. However, since
the defendant smashed into the side of plaintiff's automobile, knocking it through two front yards and a hedge,
a distance of approximately 156 feet, it is apparent that
defendant was travelling considerably faster than 32
miles per hour. It certainly is not necessary that plaintiff be able to see as far as his eye can reach before proceeding into the intersection. His duty is performed if ne
can see sufficiently far to discover whether there is
traffic approaching from that direction within a distance
traversible by a vehicle driven at a lawful speed. This is
not a case of plaintiff looking and not seeing what was
obviously there, and it is only reasonable under the facts
and evidence to assume that when plaintiff did look and
saw no vehicles approaching, and could see approximately 150 to 200 feet, that. defendant was then further east
on Stratford Avenue travelling at an unlawful rate of
speed. Whether the failure to observe was negligence
must be determined by a jury considering all the factors
10
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involved, as to the situation at the crossing and of the
respective drivers at and immediately prior to the colliSlOD.

It cannot be said in this case that the facts are such
that reasonable men could not, but conclude, that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Plaintiff, in approaching the intersection of Stratford Avenue and 18th East,
exercised the reasonable care that an ordinary prudent
man would exercise to avoid injuring or being injured by
other vehicles, in doing such, performed his duty required
under the law. For a discussion involving these various
principles, see Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile
Law & Practice, Permanent Edition, Volume II, Sections
1037, 1038 at pages 223 to 234.
It would be a waste of time to cite cases from other
jurisdictions as this court has already promulgated decisions which deal with this specific point.
At the risk of boring this court with numerous citations from its own decisions, plaintiff desires to makH a
review of the various cases dealing with this point.
In the case of BULLOCK v. LUKE, 98 Utah 501,
506, 507, 510, 511, 98 P. 2d 350, 352, 354, this court held
that a motorist approaching an intersection at a speed
of 25 miles per hour, who failed to observe a truck on
his left until he was within 20 feet of the intersection
although his view was unobstructed for a distance from
200 to 800 feet, varying inversely with his proximity to
the intersection, was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law for failing to observe the truck sooner and for in11
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sisting on his right of way after it was apparent that
the truck driver was not going to yield the right of way.
At page 352 of Pacific Reports the court states:
"Thus, under ordinary circumstances, where
Bullock and Luke approached and entered the
intersection, if Bullock had the right of way, it
presupposes that he saw Luke approaching. If
Bullock did not see Luke under circumstances
where he should have seen him, he was careless,
and, if as a result of such carelessness, either
alone or in conjunction with carelessness on the
part of Luke·, a coJlision between them occurred,
then it does not lie in the mouth of Bullock to
assert that he assumed Luke would give him that
right. His own carelessness is inconsistent with
such an assumption. This principle, we believe,
is decisive of the· facts of this case under Bullock's
testimony that he did not see Luke until he, Bullock, was some 20 feet south of the point of impact, 5 feet short of the distance within which he
could have stopped at the rate of speed he was
travelling."
At page 352 Pacific Reports this court quotes from
Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Volume II, permanent edition, page 203, par. 1038:
"There is no arbitrary rule as to the time and
place of looking for vehicles on an intersecting
· road, and no particular distance from the intersection is prescribed for that purpose. The general standards are that observation should be made
at the first opportunity and at a point where the
observation will be reasonably efficient for, and
conduce to, protection."
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion, states at page

12
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354 of Pacific Reports :

''* * * ''Thile one n1ust exercise that degree
of rare "\Yhich the situation dictates, even though
the situation has a negligent factor in it created
by another, "\Ye n1ust be careful not to stretch contributory negligence to the p·oint "\vhere we make it
inctnnbent upon one not only to drive carefully,
but to driYe so carefully as always to be pTepared
for some sudden burst of negligence of another
and be able to avoid it .. * * * The duty of A to
avoid the negligence of B should only begin where
that negligence was or should have been timely apparent to A, and apparent that it would in al.l
probability continue, and A then failed to use
such care as a prudent man would have used in
like circumstances to avoid it. * * *"
Is it possible for the trial court to say that the instant case falls within the category of Bullock v. Luke~
How could plaintiff have failed to maintain a proper
lookout under facts as presented in the record~ Certainly the Bullock case would not so hold. Plaintiff Martin was not alerted to the negligence of defendant nor
would any reasonable person have been alerted to such
danger.
In the case of HICKOK V. SKINNER, 113 Utah
1, 7, 11, 190 P. 2d 514, 517, 518, 519 where plaintiff, having
seen defendant's automobile app·roaching the intersection on a through highway 400 to 500 feet away,
started his automobile forward from a point 20 feet back
from the intersection and drove almost across the highway without again looking in the direction from which
defendant's auto was approaching, plaintiff was held con13
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tributorily negligent, precluding a recovery, notwithstanding that defendant should have yielded the right
of way.
The court states in this case at page 517 of Pacific
Reports:
"While the facts in the case of Bullock v.
Luke * * * are dissimilar, one of the rules laid
down by that case is applicable here, and that is,
regardless of which driver is technically entitled
to the right of way, both operators must use due
care and caution in proceeding into and across
intersections. While the burden to drive so carefully as always to be prepared for, and to be able
to avoid, the negligence of another, should not be
placed upon either driver, there should be placed
upon both the burden to keep a proper lookout
and to use reasonable care to avoid a collision.

* * *"
Justice Wolfe, in his dissent, states at pages 518 and
519 of Pacific Reports :
"Where an intersection is controlled by a
semaphore, the rights of various streams of traffic to proceed and the duties of other streams of
traffic to halt are clearly indicated by the various
colored lights of the signal, little or nothing is
left to human judgment. But where an intersection is controlled only by stop signs, or is uncontrolled, the rights of drivers to proceed and
their duties to halt are, to a large extent, determined by human judgment. * * * And since the
relative rights and duties of drivers approaching
an intersection such as this depend to a large extent upon the exercise of human judgment, I am
inclined to the opinion that the question of
whether or not the judgment exercised by the

14
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driYers 'Yas reasonable is a question of fact for
the jury."
In the Hickok rase, plaintiff was aware of the approach of defendant toward the intersection, but disregarded this factor and drove across the highway without giving heed to the warning. Plaintiff Martin could
not foresee that defendant would burst into view traveling at an unlawful rate of speed. Plaintiff had the right
to assume, until given warning to the contrary, that defendant would approach at a lawful speed.
In the case of CONKLIN V. WALSH, 113 Utah 276,
280, 193 P. 2d 437, 439, a truck driver who, while driving
a truck on an arterial highway at a speed of 30 to 45
miles per hour, observed an auto approaching from the
left into an intersecting street at 10 or 15 miles per hour
while the truck was a quarter of a block from the intersection. The truck driver looked to the right and failed
until too late to avoid the collision to observe that the
motorist, after stopping, was attempting to drive across
the arterial highway. The truck driver was held guilty
of negligence as a matter of law.
The court states at page 439 Pacific Reports :

"* * * By his own admission the truck driver
travelled at least one quarter of a block without
making any further observance of a car which,
at the time he first saw it, was much nearer the
intersection than was his* * *"
Here again in the Conklin case, plaintiff was aware
of defendant's approach into the intersection and yet disregarded it. Such fact is not present in the instant case.
15
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In the case of HUNTER V. MICHAELS, ______ Utah
------, 198 P. 2d 245, Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion
states at page 253 of Pacific Reports:
"I agree, however, with the Chief Justice that
under the California law it is not negligence in law
for a person to cross the street at any place other
than at a crosswalk. I am also in accord with the
view that it is a jury question as to whether the
plaintiff exercised due care in keeping a lookout
while she was crossing the street, and whether she
gave sufficient rea.ppra.isals of the traffic approaching from the west as she was proceeding
across. That is what I contended for in Hickok
v. Skinner* * *"
c:an this court say as a matter of law that plaintiff
failed to appraise the situation as he approached the intersection of Stratford Avenue and 18th East Street~
This is a question for the jury to decide, not the court.
In MINGUS V. OLS.SON, et al, ______ Utah ______ , 205
P. 2d 495, 498, the evidence established that as a matter
of law the pedestrian was contributorily negligent in
attempting to cross a street on a crosswalk, either because he failed to lo9k, or having looked, he failed to
see what he should have seen.
Justice Wolfe states in the majority opinion, page
498, Pacific Reports:
·"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian who
undertakes to cross a busy street of a large city,
·without first observing for vehicular traffic, is
guilty of contributory negligence. And this is true
even though he may be crossing in a crosswalk and
have the right of way. In the recent case of Hickok
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v. Skinner * * * this court held that a motorist
who had the right of 'vay arross an intersection,
nevertheless had the duty to observe for traffic
as he proceeded across the intersection. The
rights of pedestrians to the use of the public
streets are the same as those of motorists neither greater nor less. Hence the same general
duties devolve upon them. A p·edestrian crossing
a public street in a crosswalk or pedestrian lane,
although he may have the right of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly decedent neglected
that duty in this case. It follows that he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of course,
we do not mean to imply that a mere glance in that
direction of· the .approaching automobile would
suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it the
duty to see what is there to be seen and to pay
heed to it."
There is no question but that plaintiff had the right
of way in the instant case. He ap;praised the situation
before traveling through the intersection, and whether
or not defendant was there to be seen, in view of all
the facts, was a question for the jury to decide and not
the court.

In the case of NIELSON V. MAUC.HLEY, ______ Utah
------, 202 P. 2d 547, 549, the evidence was that plaintiff,
while driving his automobile on an icy road at 25 miles
per hour, saw defendant backing a school bus out of his
yard. Plaintiff was then 300 feet away. He reduced his
speed to 20 miles per hour at 243 feet and continued at
that speed until 115 feet from the driveway, when he
applied his brakes to avoid colliding with the school bus
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which defendant had backed clear across the road. Plaintiff was not held guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. Justice Wade in that opinion, page 549
of Pacific Reports, states:
"In holding that the court erred in finding
as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, we do not wish it understood that the jury could not have so found.
Whether or not plaintiff acted as a reasonably
prudent man under the circumstances is a question of fact for the jury to determine. The mere
fact that plaintiff had the right of way would not
give him the right to proceed without regard to
existing conditions. He 1nust exercise due care
and act as a reasonably prudent man would act
under the existing circumstances. S.ee Bullock v.
Luke .. Hickok v. Skinner .. Conklin v. Walsh ..
and McDougall v. Morrison, 55 Cal. App. 2d 92,
130 Fd 149, on page 151 wherein it is stated:
" 'Each case must turn upon its own facts.
Contributory negligence, as a matter of law, can
only be found where reasonably prudent minds
cannot but conclude that a reqsonable careful and
prudent person, situated as was plaintiff, would
not have acted as he did. The situations where
a court will so declare are rare. * * *' "
Without intending to raise additional issues in the
case, it appears to the writer that the court, through
Justice Wade, may be· abrogating the e·arlier rule laid
down in Hickok v. Skinner, etc., but regardless of this,
whether Plaintiff Martin acted with due care in approaching the intersection was a question for the jury.
In the case of GREN V. NORTON, ______ Utah ______ , 213
P. 2d 356, this court, speaking through Justice Latimer,
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held that 'vhere a n1otorist had an unobstructed view to
the north of the intersection for about one mile, he was
charged 'vith an a'vareness of defendant's large trailertruck approaching from the north, and plaintiff was held
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing
to maintain a proper lookout.
Here again is the doctrine that plaintiff must see
what is there to be seen where there are no obstructions,
or restrictions in the field of vision. Plaintiff is charged
with the duty of acting as a reasonably prudent man to
avoid foreseeable negligence. Plaintiff Martin cannot be
charged with knowing that defendant would suddenly
burst into view at an unlawful rate of speed.
In the case of SPACKMAN V. CARSON, ______ Utah
______ , 216 P. 2d 640, 643, an action by a motorcyclist for
damages from collision with a truck which, when the
motorcyclist first observed it, was about 200 feet away,
parked off the paved portion of the highway in front of
a dwelling, and when he next observed it was about 30
feet away on the pavement. Whether or not the motorcyclist was .negligent in the matter of lookout was for the
jury to determine. The court stated at page 643, Pacific
Reports:

"But according to plaintiff's testimony, when
he first observed the truck it was standing motionless in front of a dwelling and there was no indi~
cation whatever that it was about to be moved onto the pavement. The plaintiff was not alerted
to any immediate danger. Under these circumstances we are convinc-ed that the issue of whether
the plaintiff was negligent in failing to keep a
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more diligent lookout ahead was properly submitted to the jury."
In the case of MARTIN V. SHEFFIELD, 112 Utah
478, 484, 485, 189 P. 2d 127, 130 the plaintiff was driving
west on Wilson Avenue approaching lOth East Street.
The defendant was driving north on lOth East toward
Wilson Avenue. Plaintiff was proceeding at a speed
of about 20-25 miles per hour at the time of the collision.
When the plaintiff was 50 feet east of the intersection,
she could see south of the . intersection about 75 feet.
Looking to the south she saw no car and she did not look
again to the south until she. saw defendant's car so close
that the impact was about to occur. In this case there
were skid marks from 36-51 feet made by defendant's
car. Defendant stated he started to apply his brakes
approximately 60 feet south of the intersection. This
court stated at page 130, Pacific Reports :
"Is the evidence of plaintiff's conduct in the
operation of her husband's car such that reasonable minds must conclude that she was guilty of
contributory negligence, so that she was precluded
as a matter of law from reco~ering any judgment
for pe-rsonal injuries~ There was some evidence
in this case that plaintiff failed to keep a proper
lookout and that she failed to look to the left as
she entered the intersection, and that she was
travelling at an excessive rate of speed, from
which evidence the jury might have found negligence on her part which contributed to the accident. The only evidence as to her failure to keep
a proper lookout which is undisputed, is her testimony that she looked to the left when she was
50 feet from the intersection and that she saw no
20
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car and that she looked to her right and did not
look to her left again until she was in the intersection and sa"r defendant's car to her left as it
'vas about to crash into the left side of her car.
There. was a conflict in the evidence as to her
speed, as to the defendant's speed, and as to
whetheT the defendant stopped before the collision or stopped after the. impact with plaintiff's
car. These factors would all have some bearing on
whether the failure of plaintiff to look to her left
the instant she entered the inte.rsection contributed to the accident or prevented her from stopping
her car short of the point of impact, or prevented
her from turning to the. right to avoid the collision." (Italics supplied).
"Inasmuch as the conclusion whether or not
she was negligent must depend upon those disputed factors, which constitute the premises for
such conclusions, if those premises are jury questions, then they must first be determined before
a proper conclusion can be drawn from them. If
reasonable minds might differ as to which version of events shall be believed, then reasonable
minds might likewise differ as to whether plaintiff's own conduct contributed to the accident.
Since those conflicts in evidence, which constitute the very premises for the conclusions as to
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent, or
free from negligence, must be resolved by the
jury, the court could not properly withdraw from
the jury the determination of such issue."
In the case of COMPTON V. OGDEN UNION
RAILWAY & DEPOT CO., No. 7541, issued September
11, 1951 ______ Utah ______ , ______ P. 2d ______ , the court states :
"It seems inescapable that the deceased was
guilty of contributory negligence. It was her duty
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to look and listen for trains before going on the
tracks. She had a clear view of the tracks to the
north, well before she got far enough west to be in
the path of a train. Under the evidence, the engine
was there to be seen. If decedent had looked at
anytime, either as she started, or as she pursued
a course parallel to, but dangerously near the
tracks, she must necessarily have seen the train
approaching. She was, therefore, either negligent
in failing to look or in failing to heed the train
if she saw it * * * (citations) * * * We. find no circumstances of obstructed view or hearing; nor
where other trains would confuse the deceased as
existed in the cases of Malizia v. Oregon Shortline
Ry Co. * * * The trial court was, therefore, correct in its ruling that she was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law."
The question in the instant case is whether defendant's car was there to be seen when plaintiff looked. In
view of the factors of speed, distance, visibility, etc.,
which must be determined before plaintiff can be charged
with failure to maintain a proper lookout, it is obvious
that only the jury can make such a determination.
(b) ASSUMING PLAINTIFF WAS IN SOME MANNER
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

It is the contention of plaintiff that even assuming
plaintiff was in some manner negligent, such negligence
could not have been a substantial legal cause of plaintiff's
injuries. It is plaintiff's contention that this case more
properly fits in with the doctrine as expressed in HESS
V. ROBINSON, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510. In this case
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the driYer of the rar traveling a through strePt, even
though he should have seen an runbulance, 'vhich according to the eYidenre "~as traYeling bet\veen ~5 and 50 miles
per hour, he could not kno"T it would not stop for the
stop sign until the ye hicles "Tere so close together that it
'vould haYe no chance to avoid the collision.
Also, in the recent case of LOWDER V. HOLLEY,
______ Utah______ , 233 P. 2d 350, 351, 352, 353, 355 this court
through Justice ,,. .ade, stated as follovvs :
"Reading the record in the light most favorable to respondents, as we must do since the trier
of the facts found in their favor, it appears that
on ~Iay 30, 1947, Decoration Day, at about 6 :30
P.~I. Amasa Lowder, one of the respondents herein, accompanied by Alene Lowder, his wife, and
the other respondent herein, and two of their
small children, was driving his 1937 Pontiac
sedan westerly along a willow and tree lined
graveled road running in an east-west direction
situated in Mapleton, Utah. This road was rough,
wet, and not very wide and he, therefore, did not
drive more than twenty miles an hour until he
approached a place where this road intersected
with another road running north and south at
which time he slowed down to approximately 5 to
10 miles per hour and as he reached the intersection, Amasa Lowder looked north and south but
did not observe any cars in either direction. From
the intersection when Amasa Lowder looked he
could see up to a house located about 40 rods
northwest of the intersection but his view of the
road north beyond the house was obstructed by an
orchard north of it. Having looked he entered
the intersection and the rear end of his car had
passed about three feet beyond the· center line
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of the traveled portion of the north-south road
when it was hit on its rear right side by a light
Terraplane pickup truck being driven south by
Ruth Holley along the north-south road. The
north-south road with which the east-west road intersected was also a graveled road and was 54
feet wide from fence line to fence line. Heavy
black gouge marks left by the tires of the pickup
truck in the gravel north of the point of impact
indicated that Ruth Holley applied her brakes
about 30 feet before the collision and then after
the collision her truck had traveled about 75 feet
across the intersection on the east side going
south and Amasa Lowder's car was shoved about
25 feet across the road to the southwest corner of
the intersection. The officer investigating the
accident testified that from the physical facts
disclosed by the marks and tracks on the highway,
he was of the opinion that the driver of the pickup truck was traveling at the rate of about 40 to
50 miles per hour. Although Ruth Holley testified that she was only driving at the rate of 30
miles an hour she admitted that she didn't look
east of the intersection until she was almost at
the intersection and then her view was obstructed
by a pile of dirt and she couldn't see anything.
She further testified that as soon as she observed
Amasa Lowder's car in the intersection she applied her brakes.
"From what we have outlined abo:ve, although
there was no evidence that Ruth Holley drove in
excess of 50 miles per hour, as the court as the
trier of the facts found, the evidence was clearly
sufficient for the trier of the facts to reasonably
find that she was driving at about 50 miles per
hour and could reasonably find, as it did, that she
failed to keep a lookout and failed to yield the
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right of way to . A.n1asa Low·der's car which was already in the intersection and had almost reached
the "~est side of it before her car entered the intersection and that this negligence· of Ruth Holley
'vas the proximate cause of the coJlision.
''Appellants strenuously argue that respondent Amasa Lowder's contributory negligence precludes both him and his wife from any recovHry
for damages and injuries. They argue that he
failed to look and see Ru,th Holley's truck before
he entered the intersection and had he looked he
would have seen the truck and it would have been
his duty to refrain from entering the intersection
until he could do so safely. Appellants are correct in stating that before entering an intersection the driver of a car must look and determine
whether it is safe to enter. However, under the
facts as the court found them, had Amasa Lowder
observed the truck just before he entered the intersection he would have been justified in considering it safe to enter because at that point, if
the truck was being driven at the rate of 50 miles
per hour, and Amasa Lowder was driving from 5
to 10 miles per hour, as the trier of the facts could
reasonably have found, then the truck would have
been at least 250 feet from the intersection since
his car had traveled almost the entire distance
across the intersection before the impact, and this
being so he could have assumed and acted on the
assumption that the driver of the truck would
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in its driving and that it would be safe to cross the intersection. Had Ruth Holley exercised such reasonable and ordinary care the collision would not
have occured. Under such a state of facts Amasa
Lowder's failure to see. the truck could in no way
have contributed to the accident. The court, there25
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fore, did not err in finding that Amasa Lowder
was not contributorily negligent." (Italics supplied.)
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion, states:
"As the plaintiff approached the intersection,
he looked in both directions, shifted into second
gear and proceeded across at 5 to 10 miles per
hour. Plaintiff had gone about two-thirds of the
way across the intersection so that the front of
his car had reached the fence line on the west
side of the north-south road, upon which defendant was approaching from the north, when plaintiff's car was struck in the right rear by defendant's truck. The investigating officer estimated
that the defendant was traveling between 40 and
50 miles per hour, basing his opinion upon defendant's skid marks and the damage to both automobiles. Thus, the defendant was traveling approximately seven times faster than the plaintiff.
Evidence concerning the presence of a dirt pile
and an orchard which affected visibility was considered by the trial judge, sitting as the fact
finder. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
"I believe the judgment should he affirmed
because the great disparity in speed between these
two automobiles places this case in the Hess v.
Robinson, 109· Utah 60, 163 P. 510 category rather
than that o£ Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d
350. Although the road defendant was traveling
is a better road permitting greater speed, there
was no stop sign at this intersection. Both roads
are gravel. Whether the plaintiff upon entering
the intersection should have observed the defe.ndant's car, which could have been some 250 feet
away, or if upon discovering it plaintiff reasonably could have assumed that he had the right of
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zcay and that the defend ant would slow up to let
hirn across are all questions of fact. Reasonable
minds can and certainly do differ in such a situat-ion as this. I cannot say there was error in the
fact finder's conclusions."
Had Plaintiff Martin observed the defendant's car
before he entered the intersection he would have been
justified in considering it safe to enter. Assuming plaintiff was at that time traveling 10 miles per hour plaintiff covered some 46 or 50 feet before defendant ran into
him. From the evidence, the point of impact was in the
southwest quadrant of the intersection. Assuming defendant was traveling 32 miles per hour, defendant would
have been at least 150 feet from the intersection. Of
course, it is obvious that defendant was traveling considerably faster than 32 miles per hour and it is only
reasonable to assume that defendant was traveling between 45 to 55 miles per hour. From the facts in evidence a jury could find defendant to have been traveling
at such a speed. At this rate of speed defendant would
have been around 250 feet from the intersection. Under
such a state of facts Plaintiff Martin could have assumed
and acted on the assumption that the defendant would
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in his driving and
that it would be safe to cross the intersection. Had defendant exercised such reasonable and ordinary care the
collision would not have occurred. Under such a state
of facts, plaintiff Martin's failure to see defendant could
in no way have contributed to the accident, therefore,
the trial court erred in finding Plaintiff Martin contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion plaintiff apologizes for the numerous
and sometimes lengthy quotations set forth in his brief.
However, in view of the past history of cases of this type,
plaintiff felt it necessary in order to impress upon the
court the distinctions and differences which they have
laid down. The trial court in this case caused the plaintiff considerable expense when this matter was not submitted to the jury as it should have been. It is the jury's
sole prerogative to determine questions of fact where
reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusions
reached. Can this court, or the trial court say, under the
facts as presented, that reasonable minds could not but
conclude, that Plaintiff Martin was negligent for failing
to maintain a proper lookout in view of the numerous
factors which must be determined, such as ; the speed
defendant was traveling; obstructions and restrictions in
the field of vision relative to the "blind intersection"
to the east; distances traveled by the vehicles; whether
plaintiff fa~led to see what a reasonable observation
would have revealed; and whether or not plaintiff's failure to make a reasonable observation was a factor in
causing the accident.
It is earnestly contended by plaintiff that the trial
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court was wrong in its determination and plaintiff has
been caused serious injury thereby. The judgment of
the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
l\IcCuLLOUGH, BoYCE & McCuLLOUGH,
Attorneys for Appellant,
417 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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